The government has prepared a second state program covering the years 2027–2030 for the return to the liberated territories.
The implementation of the “First State Program on the Great Return,” which began in 2023, concludes at the end of this year. According to official figures, 25 billion manats were spent on the work carried out over 4 years, but a significant portion of the planned tasks has not been executed.
Budget expenditures for the first half of 2026 reveal that approximately 70 percent of these funds have been directed toward building road infrastructure. The remaining funds were used for the construction or restoration of residential areas, establishing social infrastructure, resettling the population, and demining operations.
Figures presented fragmentarily by government agencies show that not even half of the targets set within the framework of the first program have been met. By way of comparison, Prime Minister Ali Asadov stated at a recent meeting that to date, the return of former internally displaced persons has been ensured to 47 settlements—namely 10 cities, 3 towns, and 34 villages. Although the Prime Minister noted that more than 93,000 people are currently living, working, and studying in the liberated territories, he did not specify how many of them are former internally displaced persons.
However, in the first phase of the “Great Return” program, the goal was to reconstruct a total of 100 settlements and return 34,500 families—or 140,000 people—to their homeland. The figures announced by the Prime Minister fall far short of these indicators.
Why are the targeted goals lagging behind?
Unfortunately, there is no transparent or clear report on the year-by-year implementation of the state program. In fact, monitoring of the state program was assigned to the Center for Analysis of Economic Reforms and Communication. However, on the website of the Center’s Monitoring and Evaluation Group, there is not a single word regarding the results of these monitorings. Instead, numerous investigative journalism pieces on cases of corruption have been published during this period.
Razim Amiraslanli, Deputy Chairman of the Musavat Party and originally from Jabrayil, stated in a comment to Meydan TV that nearly 40,000 former internally displaced persons have been returned:
“Of the 47 settlements, approximately 20 have been newly restored. The rest are villages in Khojali, Aghdara, Khankendi, and Shusha that were liberated during the anti-terrorist operation. Overall, more than 93,000 people live, work, and study in the liberated territories. However, it is not correct to directly compare this figure with the return target of 140,000, because the 93,000 indicator includes people working and studying in those territories. The number of resettled former internally displaced persons is close to 40,000.”
According to our interviewee, there is a serious lag in the main indicators of the First State Program, and for this reason, as the Second State Program is being prepared, the government should not merely present new numbers to the public:
“It must disclose a full audit of the first program, an open report of expenditures, which projects were delayed and by how much, the reasons for delays, and the issue of accountability. Most importantly, the targets of the Second State Program must be concrete and measurable: How many people will return? How many people will be provided with jobs? How many families will receive land? How many new business entities will be created? What will be the average income of the residents? In which villages will schools, hospitals, transport, and other services be fully operational? The real result of the Great Return is not the number of buildings constructed. The main result will be the quality and sustainability of the lives people build in those territories.”
According to R. Amiraslanli, the 25 billion manats spent in the First State Program is an extremely large sum for Azerbaijan. He believes the state should provide detailed information on tenders, financial data, and projects, and the public ought to know the outcome of over 25 billion manats in funds.
The Deputy Chairman adds that the biggest challenge of the Great Return is less about building houses and more about building sustainable lives in those homes. In his view, one reason population resettlement is not progressing at the expected speed is that economic life is not being established at the same pace as settlement:
“A person wants to return to their native village with their family. But if there is no school, healthcare, normal transportation, permanent job, business opportunity, or source of income there, this return cannot be sustainable. Therefore, the development of the private sector and the creation of economic activity must be established as a distinct priority in practice, not just in words.”
People resettled in Karabakh are left unemployed, and there is no public transport
Former internally displaced persons resettled in the liberated territories also regularly share their complaints regarding unemployment and the failure to provide adequate living conditions. Meanwhile, Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev stated to the media a while ago that instead of filming and spreading complaints on video, residents should apply directly to officials. However, a video circulating on social media from Aytaj Amirjanli, who returned to Karabakh, reveals that she faced pressure after making direct complaints to officials. Because of this, she says she regrets moving to Karabakh and felt forced to voice her grievance publicly via social media.
A. Amirjanli, who was resettled in the village of Vangli in Aghdara, later stated in an interview with Radio Liberty that although they have been registered with the employment agency for 10 months, livestock for their livelihood has still not been provided:
“Our refugees, our internally displaced persons are all unemployed. The majority are already locking their doors and heading to Baku. If you come to Karabakh in November or December, you will see the doors of many homes locked. And everyone blames the refugees, saying they don’t want to live there. If I can’t find food or bread there, what am I supposed to do?”
Aytaj noted that there is neither a pharmacy nor public transport in the village:
“Diabetes medication costs 35 manats. I pay 50 manats for a taxi just to go back and forth. Look at how much financial loss they are causing me. If you don’t give me a salary or a job, why should I spend 50 manats on travel?”
Our interviewee Razim Amiraslanli also states that one of the most serious issues surrounding the return process is employment:
“For people to stay in those areas, there must be a permanent source of income. One of the main problems is the shortage of permanent jobs. For sustainable employment, alongside state institutions, private enterprises, processing industries, services, tourism, and agriculture must be developed.”
According to our interviewee, another crucial issue involves land and farming opportunities:
“A person returning to their native village does not just want to own a home. Especially for people living in rural areas, yards, arable land, livestock, pastures, farming, and business opportunities form the economic foundation of life. Without resolving land-use rights, registration, agricultural activities, and irrigation issues, bringing villages back to full economic life will be difficult. A farmer returning to a village needs access to land, water, machinery, credit, and markets to sell products. If these are not provided, living in the village becomes economically difficult. Not everyone returning can work in construction, the public sector, or the service industry. The needed qualifications for each district must be determined in advance, and employment programs should be designed accordingly.”
R. Amiraslanli emphasizes that transportation is also a vital issue:
“If a person lives in one village and works in another town, a practical way for them to commute must be created. Favorable conditions must also exist for small businesses. Entrepreneurs must be guaranteed access to land, credit, infrastructure, markets, and legal security. This should be the main distinction of the Second State Program: a transition must be made from the ‘build a house and relocate the person’ model to a ‘living model where a person lives, works, earns, and builds their own farm.’ If there is a house in the village, but no job, limited access to land, difficulty setting up a business, and a person has to leave for another city again to earn an income, it can hardly be called a Great Return in the full sense of the word.”
